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Abstract
With the growth of the internet it is becoming increasingly important
to understand how the behaviour of players is affected by the topology
of the network interconnecting them. Many models which involve net-
works of interacting players have been proposed and best response games
are amongst the simplest. In best response games each vertex simultane-
ously updates to employ the best response to their current surroundings.
We concentrate upon trying to understand the dynamics of best response
games on regular graphs with many strategies. When more than two
strategies are present highly complex dynamics can ensue. We focus upon
trying to understand exactly how best response games on regular graphs
sample from the space of possible cellular automata. To understand this
issue we investigate convex divisions in high dimensional space and we
prove that almost every division of k − 1 dimensional space into k con-
vex regions includes a single point where all regions meet. We then find
connections between the convex geometry of best response games and the
theory of alternating circuits on graphs. Exploiting these unexpected con-
nections allows us to gain an interesting answer to our question of when
cellular automata are best response games.
1 Introduction
Game theory is a rich subject which has become more diverse over the years.
Early game theory [10] focused on how rational players would behave in strate-
gic conflicts. Concepts like the Nash equilibrium [6] helped theorists to predict
final outcomes of games, and this benefited areas like economics. A more recent
development is evolutionary game theory [5]. Rather than assuming that players
are hyper-rational, evolutionary game theory concerns itself with large popula-
tions of players that change their strategies via simple selection mechanisms.
Players repeatedly engage in games with other members of the population and
the way the populations strategies evolve depends upon the selection mechanism
employed.
One way to introduce a spatial aspect into evolutionary games is to imagine
the players as vertices within a graph [9], [8]. The links represent interactions
so vertices play games with their neighbours. The players adapt their strate-
gies over time to try to increase their success against neighbours. Many kinds
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of update rules have been investigated. These include imitation, where ver-
tices imitate their most successful neighbour, and best response, where vertices
update to employ the strategy best suiting their current surroundings. In [7]
the authors study a two dimensional cellular automata with update rules based
upon games, beautiful patterns emerge.
The update mechanism that we concentrate upon is best response, where
vertices update to employ the strategy that maximisie their total payoff in a
game with each neighbour. The vertices update their strategies myopically and
synchronously. The strategy a vertex updates to may not be optimal because
neighbouring vertices change their strategies at the same time. Work on these
kind of systems includes [1] and [2], where it was shown that a two strategy
game running upon any graph will eventually reach
a fixed point or period two orbit. Two strategy best response games on
various graph structures were also studied in [3].
The systems we consider are essentially cellular automata with update rules
that are induced by the details of the game. In our consideration of best re-
sponse games on the circle we will see many of Wolfram’s 256 elementary cellular
automata [11] appear. Under these models the states of the vertices on a circle
or line graph take values in {0, 1}. The states of vertices change with time so
that the future state of any cell depends upon the current state of itself and
its neigbours. Each systems is specified by a mapping f : {0, 1}3 7→ {0, 1} so
that f(xi−1, xi, xi+1) is the future state of a vertex in state xi with neighbours
in states xi−1 and xi+1 to its left and right. Each system is indexed with a
number f(0, 0, 0).20 + f(0, 0, 1).21 + f(0, 1, 0).22 + f(0, 1, 1).23 + f(1, 0, 0).24 +
f(1, 0, 1).25 + f(1, 1, 0).26 + f(1, 1, 1).27.
We concentrate upon games on the circle because they provide the easiest
ways to illustrate our results. Our methods can easily be extended to other
graph structures, even non-regular ones.
1.1 Definitions
For a set S let Pd(S) to be the set of size d multi sets of elements from S
i.e. Pd(S) is the set of all unordered d-tuples {s1, s2, ...., sd} of members of S,
including those d-tuples containing more than one of the same element. Let us
define a regular automata as a quad (G,S,Φ0(G), F ), where G = (V,E) is a
regular degree d graph, S is a set of states, Φ0(G) is an assignment of a state
φ0(v) ∈ S to each vertex v ∈ V (the initial configuration) and F : Pd(S) 7→ S is
the update function/rule.
Such a regular automata evolves so that at time step t ∈ N0, the future state
of a vertex v, at time t+ 1, will be
φt+1(v) = F ({s1, s2, ..., sd}) (1)
where
{s1, s2, ..., sd} = {φt(u)|u ∈ Ne(v)} (2)
is the set of states of vertices in v’s neighbourhood, Ne(v), at time t.
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A game (ζ,M) consists of a set of strategies ζ = {1, 2, ..., k} which we label
with integers, together with a k× k payoff matrix M such that Mi,j ∈ R is the
payoff that a player receives from employing the ith strategy against the jth
strategy.
The best response games we consider take place on a degree d regular graph
G = (V,E). At time t each vertex v ∈ V employs a strategy φt(v) ∈ ζ. The
total payoff ∑
u∈Ne(v)
Mφt(v),φt(u) (3)
of v at time t is the sum of payoffs that v receives from using its strategy in
a game with each neighboring player. At time t each vertex simultaneously
updates its strategy, so that at time t+ 1 it will employ the strategy that would
have maximized its total payoff, given what its neighbours played at time t.
In other words each player updates to play the best response to its current
surroundings.
Best response games on regular graphs are quads (G, ζ,Φ0(G),M), which
are defined by a regular graph G, a game (ζ,M) and an assignment Φ0(G) of an
initial strategy to φ0(v) ∈ ζ to each vertex of G. A best response game is a reg-
ular automata (G, ζ,Φ0(G), F ) with an update function F such that, for every
unordered d-tuple of strategies {s1, s2, ..., sd} ∈ Pd(ζ), we have F ({s1, s2, ..., sd})
is the strategy in {α ∈ ζ} that maximizes
d∑
i=1
Mα,si . (4)
We refer to F as the update function induced by the game (ζ,M). Note that
in rare cases the payoff matrix could be such that two strategies are tied as
best responses to a possible local strategy configuration {s1, s2, ..., sd}. In such
a case F ({s1, s2, ..., sd}) is not properly defined. Such a problem can always be
alleviated by an infinitesimal perturbation of the elements in the payoff matrix
M. We always assume our matrix is such that this problem never occurs.
1.2 Examples on the circle
The circle graph Cn has vertices {v0, v1, ..., vn−1} with vi is adjacent to vj if and
only if |i− j| = 1 mod n. Every best response game (Cn, ζ,Φ0(Cn),M) on the
circle is a regular automata (Cn, ζ,Φ
0(Cn), F ), where the strategy φ
t+1(vi) em-
ployed by vertex vi at time t+ 1 will be F ({φt(v(i−1 mod n)), φt(v(i+1 mod n)}),
which is the strategy that maximizes the vertices’s total payoff against its neigh-
bours strategies φt(v(i−1 mod n)) and φt(v(i+1 mod n)).
The payoff matrix
M =
(
1 0
4 −2
)
(5)
is a Hawk - Dove game, where 1 is the passive dove strategy and 2 is the ag-
gressive hawk strategy. Let us consider the best response game (Cn, ζ,Φ
0(Cn),M),
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Figure 1: A space time plot showing the evolution of the Hawk - Dove example
game on the circle.
where ζ = {1, 2} and M is as above. This corresponds to the regular au-
tomata (Cn, ζ,Φ
0(Cn), F ) with update function F ({1, 1}) = 2, F ({1, 2}) = 2
and F ({2, 2}) = 1. We picture how this automata will evolves on a 30 vertex
circle from a random strategy configuration, with the space time plot pictured
in figure 1.
A space time plot [11] is a grid where the x axis is the index of the vertex
of the circle and the y axis (reading downwards) is the time step. Light gray
blocks denote employers of strategy 1 whilst dark blocks represent employers of
strategy 2. In our game a player adjacent to an employer of dove and employer
of hawk gets updated to play the hawk strategy, hence if a block on our space
time plot has a dark gray block on its left and a light gray block on its right
then the block below it will be dark gray. The system corresponds to Wolfram’s
cellular automata number 95, which is well known to have simple dynamics.
Every initial configuration evolving quickly to a fixed point or period 2 orbit.
This system is an example of a threshold game [1], [2].
More complicated dynamics occur under the 3 strategy game with payoff
matrix
M =
 3 94 4633 85 66
52 2 67
 , (6)
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the system from a random initial configu-
ration on a 60 vertex circle over 40 time steps. In this case dark gray, white
and light gray blocks represent strategies 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The resulting
cellular automata can be reduced to Wolfram’s cellular automata number 90
which has been proven to be chaotic [4] when running on an infinite circle.
In this paper we will enumerate all the update functions F that can be in-
duced by 2,3 or 4 strategy best response games on the circle by consideration
of the convex geometry behind best response game. Understanding this con-
vex geometry allows one to understand how the update rules of arbitrary best
response games are induced.
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Figure 2: A space time plot showing the evolution of the three strategy game
described by the payoff matrix in equation 6.
2 Convex geometry behind best response games
For a game (ζ,M), let us think of each strategy i ∈ ζ = {1, 2, ..., k} as a unit
vector
e(i) = (δ1,i, δ2,i, ...., δk,i) ∈ Rk, (7)
where δi,j is the Kronecker delta.
The strategy space ∆ ⊆ Rk is the convex hull of the set of unit strategy
vectors. The points
x = (x1, x2, ..., xk) ∈ ∆ (8)
are probability distributions over the set of strategies ζ so that xi is the fraction
of the ith strategy employed in the strategy vector x.
The affine hull of {e(i)|i ∈ ζ} forms the extended strategy space S which we
can write as
S = {x ∈ Rk|x1T = 1}, (9)
where 1 is the length k vector with each entry equal to 1. Here S is isomorphic
to Rk−1 and ∆ ⊂ S so we think of ∆ as a k − 1 dimensional unit simplex, with
the k unit strategy vectors e(i) as its vertices. For each pair of strategy vectors
x,y ∈ S the payoff one receives from playing x against y is
xMyT . (10)
The best response set to any strategy vector x ∈ S is the set of pure strategies
i such that ∀j ∈ ζ
e(i)MyT ≥ e(j)MyT . (11)
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The ith best response region Ri ⊆ S is the set of all points in S that have
a best response set equal to i ∈ ζ, in other words Ri is the set of points x ∈ S
where
[Mx]i ≥ [Mx]j ,∀j ∈ ζ − i. (12)
Let us define a ‘division’ of a subset of Euclidian space to be a collection of
closed regions such that every point of the space lies within some region, and
the interiors of any pair of distinct regions do not intersect. We say a division
is convex when each of its regions is convex. Every k strategy game (ζ,M)
induces a division of S into m ≤ k convex best response regions Ri, because
every point of S belongs to some best response region Ri, and pairs of distinct
best response regions only intersect at their boundaries.
Let Td ⊂ ∆ be the set of all points x ∈ ∆ that can be written as∑
i∈D
e(i)
d
(13)
for some D ∈ Pd(ζ) (where our sum takes into account that some elements may
occur in D several times). The set of points Td will be partitioned into different
best response regions Ri ∩ Td and the nature of this partition determines the
update function F of the regular automata that occurs when the game (ζ,M) is
used for a best response game on a d regular graph. We say that the partition
of Td into different best response regions Ri ∩Td is the best response partition
of Td induced by the game (ζ,M).
Suppose we have a generic best response game (G, ζ,Φ0(G),M), where G
is a regular degree d graph. This will be a regular automata (G, ζ,Φ0(G), F )
where F (D) is the strategy j ∈ ζ such that∑
i∈D
e(i)
d
∈ Rj ,∀D ∈ Pd(ζ). (14)
Consider for example the Hawk-Dove game discussed in the previous section.
This is a two strategy game so our strategy space ∆ is the unit line. We can
plot the payoffs one receives from playing strategy 1 or 2 against the different
strategy vectors x ∈ ∆ as shown in figure 3. This induces a convex division of ∆
into two best response regions R1 and R2. The update function F is determined
by considering how the points of
T2 = {(1, 0), (1/2, 1/2), (0, 1)} (15)
are divided up into these best response regions. For example (1/2, 1/2) ∈ R2
so F ({1, 2}) = 2.
For a 3 strategy game the simplex ∆ is the unit triangle. Again we can plot
the payoffs one receives from playing pure strategies against strategy vectors in
∆. In figure 4 (left) the x-y plane represents the different strategy vectors, and
the z coordinate representing the payoffs one receives from employing different
6
Figure 3: A plot showing the payoff received from using pure strategies against
mixed strategies in the game described by equation 5. The best response division
is calculated by observing the pure strategy that scores best against each point
of the strategy space
Figure 4: On the left is an illustration of how pure strategies score different
payoffs against mixed strategies in three strategy games. On the right is the
best response division associated with the game described by equation 6.
7
pure strategies against these vectors. Again this induces a division of the simplex
∆ into convex best response regions.
Theorem 2.1 ∀d, k > 0
A partition of the points of Td into m ≤ k subsetsWi ⊆ Td is induced by the
best response division associated with some k strategy game (ζ,M) if and only
if the convex hulls of each pair of distinct subsets Wi and Wj do not intersect.
Theorem 2.1 allows us to determine when a given k state regular automata
is a best response game. The proof is in the appendix and the remainder of
this section describes the geometry of best response divisions in more detail.
Given a non-singular payoff matrix M we can find a division of the (k − 1)-
dimensional space S into (open) best response regions Ri. First we will consider
best response divisions of S. Later we will consider how such divisions divide
up the points of the simplex of attainable strategies
∆ = {x ∈ S : x ≥ 0}. (16)
For each pair i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} : i 6= j let H(i, j) ⊂ S be the set of all x ∈ S
where
[Mx]i = [Mx]j . (17)
The hyperplane H(i, j) is the set where the payoffs to pure strategies i and j
are equal. Since M is non-singular this hyperplane has dimension k − 2. The
hyperplane divides S into two regions, one where the payoff to pure strategy i
exceeds that to pure strategy j, and the other where the payoff to pure strategy
j exceeds that to pure strategy i. Each of the n(n−1)2 pairs {i, j} define such a
dividing hyperplane. The set
∪i,j∈{1,2,...,k}:i 6=j H(i, j) (18)
of all of these hyperplanes together divide up the space S into the k! distinct
regions corresponding to the distinct orderings of the k payoffs at each point.
The best response region Ri is the union of (k−1)! of these k! regions, and these
are necessarily contiguous. The set of regions correspond to the orderings of
{1, 2, . . . , k}, i.e. the permutations. The Cayley graph of the group Sk under the
generator set of transposition of adjacent elements corresponds to the adjacency
of the Ri. Each transposition corresponds to the crossing of a hyperplane where
there is equality of the payoffs for the elements which are transposed.
Alternately we can consider the sets
B(i) = {1, 2, . . . , k} − {i}, (19)
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and H(B(i)) is the set of x ∈ S where the payoffs to the elements of B(i) are
equal. Since M is non-singular there exists a unique value
x∗ =
M−1l
lTM−1l
(20)
(A Nash equilibrium of the system). Each H(B(i)) passes through x∗ and on one
side the payoff to i is greater than that to all the others, and on the other side it
is less. We consider the set of k rays consisting of x(k) and that part of H(B(i))
where the payoff to i is less than the payoff to the other strategies, Ui. Since
our matrix is non-singular the set of rays form a basis for the simplex. For some
set V ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , k} the convex combination of the corresponding rays, ∪i∈V Ui
is the set where there is equality of the payoffs to the set of payoffs indexed
by the elements not in V, all elements in V having lower payoffs. The regions
Ri are the interiors of the (closed) regions generated by convex combinations
of points from V = B(i). Each of these k closed regions is bounded by (k − 1)
rays.
Thus we have that the division of the unit simplex into the k best response
regions is simply achieved by taking a point in the hyperplane containing the
unit simplex, and k rays emanating from that point with the condition that
the reflection of any ray in the central point lies in the convex hull of the other
(k − 1) rays.
The converse of the above argument is simply that if we have a division of
the hyperplane containing the unit simplex according to the above rule then
we can find a unique matrix which corresponds to those rays. Of course in the
context of a game on a circle there will be many sets of rays which produce the
same best response regions, and thus many payoff matrices. Suppose then that
we are given the specification of the rays as a set of linearly independent vectors
ui for i = 1, 2, . . . , k and form the matrix U which has the columns equal to
the ui, then we select any matrix A with ith column which have equal entries
except for the diagonal entry which is smaller. Now we only require to find
matrix M such that
MU = A (21)
i.e. M = AU−1, for this matrix M to provide us with an appropriate payoff
matrix, though we may require to add a constant to all elements if we require
payoffs to be positive.
Example. Suppose the rays from the central equilibrium value are such that
the matrix U is given by
U =

1 2 3 3
2 3 4 1
3 1 2 4
4 4 1 2

Note that the columns add to a constant but this is not required. Now we
can select any appropriate matrix A. For ease we take −I, where I is the unit
matrix. We have
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M =

0.5444 −0.2333 −0.3444 −0.0111
−0.3889 0.1667 0.3889 −0.2778
0.1111 −0.3333 −0.1111 0.2222
−0.3667 0.3000 −0.0333 −0.0333

and we can add 1 if we require positive entries.
3 Games on the circle with 2 or 3 strategies
We can apply theorem 2.1 to enumerate the two strategy best response games
on the circle. To do this we must simply list all the different possible ways to
divide up our simplex ∆, the unit line, into two or less convex regions, with
respect to the three points of T2 - the lines two end points and the mid point.
There are only two ways of doing this, either all points belong to the same
region or one end point belongs to one region and the other two points belong
to the other. We can take each of these two unlabeled divisions and apply
labels to the regions, deciding which best response regions they represent. We
hence find that there are six non-identical two strategy best response game on
the circle, three of which are permuationally distinct, meaning there are three
fundamentally different types of two strategy best response games (see Table
1).
Table 1: The payoff inequalities describe the three types of two strategy game
that induce fundamentally different dynamics in best response games on the
circle.
Payoff inequalities that generate game type Example game
M1,1 >M2,1, M1,2 >M2,2 Trivial
M2,1 >M1,1, M2,1 +M2,2 >M1,1 +M1,2, M1,2 >M2,2 Hawk-Dove
M1,1 >M2,1, M2,1 +M2,2 >M1,1 +M1,2, M2,2 >M1,2 Stag Hunt
The first type are games where one strategy strictly dominates. These sys-
tems induce very dull dynamics with every vertex constantly playing the dom-
inating strategy. Figure 1 depicts the dynamics of a game of the second type.
The dynamics induced correspond to Wolfram’s automata number 95. When
the circle has even length there are two repelling fixed points, where no adja-
cent vertices share the same strategy. The system has many period two orbits
which quickly attract other configurations. The third type of game corresponds
to Wolfram’s automata number 160. When the circle has even length there is
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a repelling period two orbit -jumping between the two configurations with no
adjacent vertices sharing the same strategy. The system has many fixed points
which quickly attract other configurations.
We can use theorem 2.1 again to enumerate the best response games on the
circle with three strategies. Recall how the best response division depicted at
the right of figure 4 induces the dynamics depicted in figure 2. Our theorem
implies that any division of ∆ (which is the unit triangle) into three or less
convex regions is induced by some game. The update function induced by such
a division depends upon the way the six points of T2 (the 3 vertices and 3
edge-midpoints of the triangle) are partitioned into these best response regions.
To enumerate all of the three strategy games we must simply list all the
fundamentally different ways of dividing up ∆ into three or less convex regions
with respect to the points of T2. There are 12 fundamentally different ways to
perform such a division.
Each division p induces an equivalence class, which is the set of best response
divisions of T2 which can be attained by taking p and labeling the regions
with different strategies -deciding which best response region each region of p
represents. By looking at the different labellings of the 12 divisions we find that
there are 285 non-identical three strategy best response games on the circle, 52
of which are permutationaly distinct. We give space time plots of the 52 cases in
the appendix (subsection 6.4), together with diagrams that show the divisions
corresponding to the equivalence classes of the games.
4 Games with more strategies
Enumeration of best response games on the circle with more than three
strategies is difficult to do in the same visual manner as above. The reason
is that the simplex is high dimensional and the number of differenr convex
divisions of the simplex with respect to T2 is large. Since the set of k strategy
best response games on the circle are a subset of the set of k state regular
automata one fruitful question to ask is when is a k state regular automata on
the circle not a k strategy best response game ?
We can think of each regular automata, (G,S,Φ0(G), F ), on a d regular
graph G, as inducing a partition of Td ⊂ ∆ in a similar way to the way we
did for best response games. To do this is that we think of our set of states as
numbers S = {1, 2, ..., k} and we think of each D ∈ Pd(S) as a point
P(D) =
∑
i∈D
e(i)
d
∈ Td (22)
in the simplex. We think of the points Td = {P(D) : D ∈ Pd(S)} as being
11
partitioned into m ≤ k subsets Wi where Wi is the set of all points P(D) such
that F (D) = i.
The converse of theorem 2.1 is that a regular automata (G,S,Φ0(G), F )
is not a k strategy best response game if and only if the partition of Td that
(G,S,Φ0(G), F ) induces has a distinct pair of sets Wi and Wj with intersecting
convex hulls.
So to answer our question, we should find all of the pairs of disjoint subsets
X,Y ⊆ Pd(S) such the convex hulls of {P(D)|D ∈ X} and {P(D)|D ∈ Y }
intersect. We call such an X,Y pair (k, d) unacceptable because a k state
regular automata (G,S,Φ0(G), F ) on a d regular graph is not a best response
game if and only if S has a pair of states i 6= j, such that F−1(i), F−1(j) are
(k, d) unacceptable.
Clearly if a pair X,Y ⊆ Pd(S) are such that there is a pair X ′ ⊆ X and
Y ′ ⊆ Y where X ′, Y ′ are (m, d) unacceptable, for m ≤ k, then X,Y are (k, d)
unacceptable. Knowing this we can tighten the definition of unacceptable pairs,
to lessen the number of objects we need to catalogue to determine whether or
not a regular automata is a best response game.
We say that a pair X,Y ⊆ Pd(S) are fundamentally (k, d) unacceptable if
and only if X,Y are (k, d) unacceptable and ∀X ′ ⊆ X, ∀Y ′ ⊆ Y , ∀m ≤ k we
have that X ′, Y ′ are (m, d) unacceptable implies {X ′, Y ′} = {X,Y } and m = k.
In other words a fundamentally unacceptable pair is an unacceptable pair
that properly contains no other unacceptable pairs. So we arrive at theorem
4.1.
Theorem 4.1 ∀d, k > 0
A k state regular automata (G,S,Φ0(G), F ) on a d regular graph is a best
response game if and only if ∀m ≤ k, for every pair of states i 6= j of S, there
does not exist a pair X ⊆ F−1(i),Y ⊆ F−1(j) that is fundamentally (m, d)
unacceptable.
Our enumeration problem is hence transformed into the problem of finding
the set of permuationally distinct fundamentally unacceptable pairs. The set of
different convex partitions of Td can be found by listing all the permuationally
distinct partitions of Td and then filtering out those partitions which involve a
pairs X,Y such that X ′ ⊆ X, Y ′ ⊆ Y is fundamentally (m, d) unacceptable, for
m ≤ k.
Let us consider the problem on the circle, when d = 2. There are no fun-
damentally (1, 2) unacceptable pair because P2({1}) cannot be split into two
disjoint non-empty sets. The fundamentally (2, 2) unacceptable pairs can be
found visually, the only permuationally distinct way one may choose two dis-
joint subsets A and B of T2 = {(1, 0), (1/2, 1/2), (0, 1)} such that the convex
hulls of A and B intersect is A = {(1, 0), (0, 1)} and B = {(1/2, 1/2)}. The
pair X,Y , where X = {{1, 1}, {2, 2}} and Y = {{1, 2}} is hence the only per-
muationally distinct fundamentally (2, 2) unacceptable pair.
The set of fundamentally (3, 2) unacceptable pairs can again be found visu-
ally. It is easy to see that, if the convex hulls of two disjoint sets of T2, in the
12
Figure 5: The two fundamentally (3, 2) unacceptable pairs within the two di-
mensional simplex ∆. The left shows {{2, 2}, {1, 3}}, {{3, 3}, {1, 2}}, the right
shows {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}, {{2, 2}, {1, 3}}.
unit triangle, intersect, then one of the two situations depicted in figure 5 must
have occurred.
For a pair of disjoint sets X,Y ⊂ P2(S), let Gr(X,Y ) be the graph with a
vertex set consisting of all x ∈ S such that x is a member of a pair in X or
Y , and edge set consisting of dark gray edges X and light gray edges Y . An
alternating walk on such a graph Gr(X,Y ) is a walk on the edges of Gr(X,Y )
such that every edge traversed is a different colour to the previously traversed
edge. An alternating cycle of such a graph is an alternating walk that finishes on
the same vertex where it started -returning along an edge of a different colour
to the colour of the edge that the walk first traversed.
Lemma 4.2 A pair X,Y is (k, 2) unacceptable if and only if Gr(X,Y ) has an
alternating cycle.
This leads to a result that allows us to completely characterise the set of funda-
mentally (k, 2) unacceptable graphs for generic k. Recall that Cn denotes the
n vertex circle graph, let C1 be a single vertex with a self loop. Let a k vertex
dumbbell graph Dum(a, b)k, where a+ b < k, be the fusing of two circle graphs
Ca+1 and Cb+1 to the two end points of a line graph (by identifying/ overlap-
ping vertices) so that the resulting graph, Dum(a, b)k, has k vertices (see figure
6). Note that when a + b = k − 1, the connecting line between the two circles
in Dum(a, b)k has no edges, and hence Dum(a, b)k resembles a figure 8 in that
it consists of two circles intersecting at one vertex.
Let a good colouring of a graph G be a colouring of its edges with dark gray
and light gray such that, if a vertex v ∈ G only has two edges incident on it then
the two edges are painted different colours and otherwise two edges incident on
a vertex v are painted different colours if and only if they do not lie on the same
cycle of G.
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Figure 6: On the left is an illustration of Dum(2, 0)5. On the right is an
illustration of Dum(5, 0)5. Both graphs have been given a good colouring.
Theorem 4.3 X,Y is fundamentally (k, 2) unacceptable if and only if one of
the following conditions hold;
1) k = 2 and Gr(X,Y ) is a good colouring of Dum(0, 0)2.
2) k > 2 is even and Gr(X,Y ) is a good colouring of Ck or Dum(a, b)k
where a, b ∈ {0, 1, ..., k} are even and such that a+ b < k
3) k > 2 is odd and Gr(X,Y ) is a good colouring of Dum(a, b)k where
a, b ∈ {0, 1, ..., k} are even and such that a+ b < k.
Using theorems 4.1 and 4.3 we can make an algorithm to check if a regular
automata on the circle corresponds to a best response game and hence we can
solve the problem of finding all of the fundamentally different 4 strategy best re-
sponse games on the circle. The way we do this is to use a computer to generate
the set of all four state degree 2 regular automata and then filter this set, remov-
ing those rules that do not correspond to best response games. We find that
there are 143524 non-identical four strategy games and 6041 permutationally
distinct games.
5 Games on other graphs
When dealing with degree three graphs, the different update functions F
that can occur correspond to convex divisions of ∆ with respect to the points of
T3. With two strategies, we may enumerate the possible best response games
by listing the different divisions of the unit line ∆ into ≤ 2 convex regions with
respect to the points of T3 = {(1, 0), (1/3, 2/3), (2/3, 1/3), (0, 1)}. Using this
approach one can determine the 5 permutationally distinct update functions
F that could be induced by two strategy best response games on degree three
graphs. Its important to note that the update rules found in this way could be
evolved upon many different graph topologies. One could consider dynamics of
the cube, the Peterson graph or any other degree three graph. The circle with
self-linkage is the degree three graph obtained by taking a circle and linking each
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vertex to itself. Looking at best response games on the circle with self linkage
is beneficial because the resulting one dimensional cellular automata can be
visualised using space time plots. The permutationally distinct two strategy
best response games running on the circle with self linkage correspond to rules
Wolfram’s elementary cellular automata numbers 0, 23, 127, 128 and 232. One
may enumerate the different three strategy games on degree three graphs in
a similar manner by listing the different ways to cut up the unit triangle into
convex regions with respect to the points of T3. Using this method one finds
that there are 82 fundamentally different three strategy best response games on
degree three graphs.
These methods can be applied to enumerate the number of k strategy games
on degree d graphs. Such an enumeration seems difficult to do for generic k and
d. Theorem 2.1 provides a way to do such an enumeration in theory but with
no result like theorem 4.3 (which allows us to quickly filter out unviable regular
automata) the computation would be slow for d > 2.
Our results can be extended to deal with non-regular graphs. Suppose we
have a graph G and {di : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} is the set of all di such that there is a
vertex of G with degree di. To enumerate the different best response games on
G one must simply list all the different ways to devide ∆ into k or less convex
regions with respect to the points of ∪ni=1Tdi .
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of theorem 2.1
Any game (G,M) will induce a division of the extended strategy space S into
best response regions Ri. To show these best response region are convex, con-
sider two points x and y within Ri, then [Mx]i > [Mx]j and [My]i > [My]j ,
∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} − i, by definition. Since M is a linear mapping any convex
combination λx+(1−λ)y, for λ ∈ [0, 1] will be such that [M(λx+(1−λ)y)]i >
[M(λx+ (1− λ)y)]j , ∀j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} − i. This means λx+ (1− λ)y also lies
within the best response region Ri. So every best response region Ri is con-
vex. This means our game induces partition of Td into best response regions
Wi = Ri ∩ Td, such that the convex hulls of any two sets Wi 6= Wj do not
overlap.
Proving the converse is more involved.
Suppose we have a partition of the points of Td into m ≤ k sets Wi such
that the convex hulls of each pair of sets do not overlap. There will be a family
of appropriate divisions of S ' Rk−1, into k convex open sets Pi, that generate
such a partition of Td in that ∀i, Wi = Pi ∩Td.
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Each such division, where every region Pi has non zero volume, must be
generated by a set of dividing hyperplanes, which is a set of k − 2 dimensional
hyperplanes that cut up the space into different regions. Each Pi is a polyhedral
set and every k − 2 dimensional face of Pi is the intersection of the closure of
Pi with one of its neighboring regions. The set of dividing hyperplanes which
generates such a division is the set of affine hulls of all such faces of all regions.
Among our family of appropriate divisions there will be a division of S into k
non-zero volume, convex sets Pi with the property that each set of k−1 dividing
hyperplanes involved in this division will meet at a single point, we will call such
a division proper. It is a well known result that almost every arrangement of k−1
hyperplanes of dimension k− 2 in Rk−1 will have a common point, such a point
will always exist provided no two of these hyperplanes have parallel subspaces.
Any division can be made proper by doing an infinitesimal perturbation of the
positioning of the dividing hyperplanes involved. Since the points of Td are
distantly spaced such a perturbation will not effect the way Td is partitioned
up. This means an appropriate proper division exists.
Suppose Pi is a region within an appropriate proper division. We shall use
a proof by contradiction to show that Pi has a finite extreme point (a vertex).
Suppose (falsely) that Pi does not have a finite extreme point. Let X denote
the closure of X. Any closed convex set, like Pi, with no finite extreme point,
must contain a line L (extending infinitely in both directions). Any translation
of L that intersects with Pi must also be contained within Pi. Let Pj be a
region adjacent to Pi. Any translation of L that intersects with Pi ∩Pj must
be contained within Pi ∩ Pj . This means any translation of L that intersects
Pj must be contained within Pj . This argument can be continued to show that
every region contains a translation of L and every dividing hyperplane contains
a translation of L. This contradicts our assumption that the division is proper
because such an arrangement of dividing hyperplanes cannot meet at a point.
Every k−2 dimensional cross section of our hyperplane arrangement attained by
slicing perpendicular to L will look the same (irrespective of how far along L one
chooses to slice) so there cannot be a point where all the dividing hyperplanes
meet. This contradiction implies every region Pi must have a vertex.
Since Pi is k − 1 dimensional a vertex of Pi must be the intersection of at
least k−1 of its faces. Each of Pi’s faces is Pi∩Pj for some neighbouring region
Pj . There are only k regions so Pi can have at most k − 1 faces. Hence Pi
has just one vertex v, and v is the intersection of the closures of all k regions.
Let I(i) be the intersection of the closures of every region except Pi, it follows
that I(i) will be a one dimensional ray that is a common one dimensional edge
of every region except Pi. There will be k such one dimensional rays I(i), that
all meet at v and every region Pj will be the interior of the convex hull of
{I(a) : a ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} − j}. Each ray must lie outside of the convex hull of the
other k − 1 rays (otherwise the interior of two regions would intersect and we
would not have a division). An equivalent way to say this is that the reflection
of any ray in v lies within the convex hull of the other k − 1 rays.
Since our regions meet at a central point with k emanating rays (that meet
the appropriate conditions) we can use the results from section 2 to construct a
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non-singular payoff matrix M which generates our convex division. Under the
game with payoff matrix M the ith best response region Ri will be equal to the
convex region Pi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}. 
6.2 Proof of lemma 4.2
We will show that a pairs unacceptability implies the presence of an alternat-
ing cycle. Suppose that X,Y ⊆ P2(S) is a (k, 2) unacceptable pair, then by
definition, there must exist subsets X ′ ⊆ X, Y ′ ⊆ Y and sets of positive reals
{λ{a,b} > 0 : {a, b} ∈ X ′} , {µ{a,b} > 0 : {a, b} ∈ Y ′} such that∑
{a,b}∈X′
λ{a,b} =
∑
{a,b}∈Y ′
µ{a,b} = 1 (23)
and ∑
{a,b}∈X′
λ{a,b}(e(a) + e(b))/2 =
∑
{a,b}∈Y ′
µ{a,b}(e(a) + e(b))/2. (24)
Now consider the graph Gr(X ′, Y ′) with each dark gray edge {a, b} ∈ X ′
weighted with the constant λ{a,b} and each light gray edge {a, b} ∈ Y ′ weighted
with the constant µ{a,b}. The sum of the weights of the dark gray edges inci-
dent upon any vertex will be equal to the sum of the weights of the light gray
edges that are incident upon that vertex (where self edges are counted as being
incident twice). Suppose w is the minimal weight on any edge of Gr(X ′, Y ′),
let us multiply all of the weights of Gr(X ′, Y ′)’s edges by 3/w, so that all of the
weights will be at least 3.
Now start on any vertex of Gr(X ′, Y ′), and walk along a dark gray edge,
when the walk traverses an edge, reduce the weight of that edge by 1. After
traversing a dark gray edge, let the walk traverse a light gray edge, then a dark
gray edge, then a light gray... and continue in this manner, reducing the weight
of every traversed edge. When an edge reaches weight ≤ 0 it disappears and
can no longer be used.
Every vertex must have at least two incident edges -one of each colour and
such a walk is allowed to traverse each edge at least twice. Moreover, every
time the walk approaches a vertex with an edge of one colour, it will be able
to leave the vertex with an edge of the other colour (at least this will be true
until an edge has been traversed twice). Clearly such a walk will be allowed
to continue, in an alternating manner, until an edge is traversed three times.
After an edge has been traversed three times it follows that some vertex v must
have been visited three times. This implies that an alternating cycle has been
generated. To see this suppose, without loss of generality, that our walk first
leaves v along a dark gray edge. If the walk returns to v, for the first time, along
a light gray edge then an alternating cycle has clearly been generated. If, on
the other hand, the walk returns to v, for the first time along a dark gray edge
then it must leave v, for the second time, along a light gray edge. When the
walk returns to v for the second time it will complete an alternating cycle. To
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see this note that whatever the colour of the edge which the walk uses to return
to v for the second time, the walk will have used an edge of the opposite colour
to leave v previously. This shows a pairs unacceptability implies the presence
of an alternating cycle.
To see the converse suppose that the graph Gr(X,Y ) contains an alternating
cycle Gr(X ′, Y ′) with X ′ ⊆ X, Y ′ ⊆ Y . Now ∀{a, b} ∈ X ′ let λ{a,b} be
the number of times that the edge {a, b} is traversed in the alternating cycle
Gr(X ′, Y ′). Similarly ∀{a, b} ∈ Y ′ let µ{a,b} be the number of times that the
edge {a, b} is traversed in the alternating cycle Gr(X ′, Y ′). We refer to λ{a,b}
as the weight of the dark gray edge {a, b} ∈ X ′ and we refer to µ{a,b} as the
weight of the light gray edge {a, b} ∈ Y ′.
Our alternating cycle will be such that the number of traversals of dark gray
edges must be equal to the number of traversals of light gray edges, and hence
our coefficients will be such that∑
{a,b}∈X′
λ{a,b} =
∑
{a,b}∈Y ′
µ{a,b} = I, (25)
for some constant I > 0.
The alternating cycle will be a walk such that every time a vertex is approached
along an edge of one colour the walk will leave the vertex along an edge of
another colour and each edge {a, b} of Gr(X ′, Y ′) is traversed by this walk a
number of times equal to its weight. It follows that, for every vertex v of
Gr(X ′, Y ′), the sum of the weights of v’s incident dark gray edges is equal
to the sum of the weights of v’s incident light gray edges (where self edges are
counted as being incident twice).
Hence we get∑
{a,b}∈X′
λ{a,b}(e(a) + e(b))/2 =
∑
{a,b}∈Y ′
µ{a,b}(e(a) + e(b))/2, (26)
so we can divide all of our parameters λ{a,b} and µ{a,b} by our constant I to
get the set of convex coefficients which describe a point where the convex hull
of {P(D)|D ∈ X} and {P(D)|D ∈ Y } intersect. 
6.3 Proof of theorem 4.3
Suppose X,Y is fundamentally (k, 2) unacceptable, then according to the def-
inition of fundamentally unacceptable pairs and lemma 4.2, Gr(X,Y ) is an
alternating cycle, and hence must be connected. Moreover there can only be
one recolouring of the edges of Gr(X,Y ), then is an alternating cycle (that re-
colouring which just swaps the colours of every edge). If this were not so then
Gr(X,Y ) would contain more than one fundamentally different alternating cy-
cle, and hence would not be fundamentally unacceptable.
Now suppose that Gr(X,Y ) has an even cycle C on more than three vertices.
C can be recoloured to be an alternating cycle, and this means that Gr(X,Y )
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consists of exactly C and nothing more. Note that C is a good colouring a circle
graph on an even number of vertices.
Next suppose that Gr(X,Y ) has no even cycles, and at most one odd cycle.
In this case X,Y can not be fundamentally (k, 2) unacceptable. To see this
consider a walk which is an alternating cycle. Such a walk must traverse a cycle
of the graph. The walk cannot take place on a purely linear graph (i.e. a line
graph) because this would imply that the walk must change direction at some
point -back tracking along the edge just used, but this violates our requirement
that the colours of edges used alternate. Now let us (falsely) suppose that
our Gr(X,Y ) does have a walk which is an alternating cycle. Since our walk
is required to traverse a cycle of Gr(X,Y ) we can assume (without loss of
generality) that the walk begins at a vertex v on the odd cycle of Gr(X,Y )
and immediately traverses the cycle. When the walk returns to v, for the first
time, it will do so along an edge of the same colour as the first edge traversed
in the walk. To complete an alternating cycle the walk must return to v along
a different colour. Clearly traversing the odd cycle again is not going to achieve
this. The only other way to try (in our efforts to form an alternating cycle) is
to have the walk leave the odd cycle, to visit other vertices of Gr(X,Y ). This
cannot be done however because Gr(X,Y ) only holds one cycle. Once our walk
leaves this cycle it will have no way to return except to backtrack, which we
have already shown is not allowed.
Now the only other possible case is that Gr(X,Y ) contains no even cycles
and at least two odd cycles C ′ and C. Since Gr(X,Y ) is connected there must
be a linear path P (a sequence of end to end edges forming a line graph) between
C ′ and C. Now C ′∪P ∪C can be given an edge recolouring (the good colouring
of C ′ ∪ P ∪ C) that is an alternating cycle. We shall construct such a cycle
by describing a walk (it will be clear that C ′ ∪ P ∪ C’s edges can be coloured
in such a way that the edge colours alternate on this walk). Suppose our walk
starts off at the intersection of P and C ′ (the vertex e′ of C ′ which is an point of
the line graph P ). Suppose the walk begins by traversing C ′, starting off with a
dark gray edge. After traversing C ′, the walk will return to e′ along a dark gray
edge. Next the walk travels along a light gray edge of P towards C. Suppose
the walk continues traveling along P until it reaches the other end point, e, of
P (which intersects with C). The walk then moves around C, returning to e
on the same colour edge by which it set off (on C), and then the walk travels
back along P , to e′. When the walk returns to e′ it will do so along a light gray
edge, thus completing the alternating cycle. So we have shown that if Gr(X,Y )
contains more than one odd cycle, then Gr(X,Y ) must exactly be of the form
C ′ ∪ P ∪ C, which is exactly the form of a dumbbell graph DUM(a, b)k where
a, b ∈ {0, 1, ..., k} are even and such that a+ b < k. Such a graph will only have
one fundamentally different alternating cycle, which can be found by doing a
good colouring of it.
So we have shown that all the graphs associated with fundamentally (k, 2)
unacceptable pairs X,Y lie in the set Ωk of graphs described in the theorem
(even length circle graphs and dumbbell graphs with odd cycles). All that
remains is to show that there are not any graphs within this set that are not (k, 2)
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unacceptable. We know that each of these graphs has at most one fundamentally
different alternating cycle and no unnecessary extra structure, so all that is left
is to show that no graph in Ωk has a proper subgraph that is a member of Ωm
for m ≤ k. For a dumbbell graph with two odd cycles, this is obvious since
every proper subgraph of it is neither a dumbbell graph, nor a circle graph of
even length. Similarly no proper subgraph of a circle graph is a circle graph or
a dumbbell graph. 
6.4 The different three strategy games on the circle
In this subsection we give example space time plots (from random initial condi-
tions) showing the dynamics of each of the 52 non-identical best response games
on the circle (see section 3). We group these plots together with the diagrams
that show the unlabeled partitions of T2 which can be coloured to yield their
best response partitions.
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